Salvatore Nunnari

Assistant Professor
Department of Economics
Bocconi University

Vice-Director at Bocconi Experimental Laboratory for the Social Sciences (BELSS); Research Affiliate at Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research (IGIER), and Carlo F. Dondena Centre for Research on Social Dynamics and Public Policy

Office: Via Roentgen 1, 5-C2-05
Phone: +39 02 58363389
Email: salvatore.nunnari [at] unibocconi.it

Curriculum Vitae
Google Scholar Profile

My research is in political economy, experimental economics, behavioral economics and applied microeconomic theory. Before joining Bocconi, I received a PhD in Social Science from the California Institute of Technology and served as an Assistant Professor at the University of California San Diego and Columbia University.

 

Published and Forthcoming Papers

  1. The Political Economy of Public Debt: A Laboratory Study, with Marco Battaglini and Thomas R. Palfrey, Journal of the European Economic Association, Forthcoming, Replication Data

  2. The Economic Effects of Electoral Rules: Evidence from Unemployment Benefits, with Vincenzo Galasso, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Forthcoming, Replication Data

  3. Durable Coalitions and Communication: Public versus Private Negotiations, with Renee Bowen and David Baron, Journal of Public Economics, 2017, 156: 1–13, Online Appendix, Replication Data

  4. Dynamic Elections and Ideological Polarization, with Jan Zapal, Political Analysis, 2017, 25(4): 505–534

  5. Gambler's Fallacy and Imperfect Best Response in Legislative Bargaining, with Jan Zapal, Games and Economic Behavior, 2016, 99: 275–294, Supplementary Material

  6. Quantal Response and Nonequilibrium Beliefs Explain Overbidding in Maximum-Value Auctions, with Colin Camerer and Thomas R. Palfrey, Games and Economic Behavior, 2016, 98: 243–263, Replication Data

  7. The Dynamic Free Rider Problem: A Laboratory Study, with Marco Battaglini and Thomas R. Palfrey, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2016, 8(4): 268–308, Replication Data

  8. Turnout Across Democracies, with Helios Herrera and Massimo Morelli, American Journal of Political Science, 2016, 60(3): 607–624, Supplementary Information, Replication Data

  9. Dynamic Free Riding with Irreversible Investments, with Marco Battaglini and Thomas R. Palfrey, American Economic Review, 2014, 104(9): 2858–2871, Online Appendix

  10. Legislative Bargaining and the Dynamics of Public Investment, with Marco Battaglini and Thomas R. Palfrey, American Political Science Review, 2012, 106(2): 407–429, Online Appendix

   
   

Working Papers

  1. Audi Alteram Partem: An Experiment on Selective Exposure to Information, with Giovanni Montanari, IGIER Working Paper No. 650

  2. Veto Power in Standing Committees: An Experimental Study, IGIER Working Paper No. 649

  3. Dynamic Legislative Bargaining with Veto Power, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 12938

  4. Declared Support and Clientelism, with Simeon Nichter, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 13460

  5. Looking into Crystal Balls: An Experiment on Reputational Cheap Talk, with Debrah Meloso and Marco Ottaviani, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 13231

  6. A Model of Focusing in Political Choice, with Jan Zapal, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 12407

  7. A Theory of Power Wars, with Helios Herrera and Massimo Morelli

   
   

Experimental Software

oTree App for Bargaining in Ad Hoc Committees (i.e., Legislative Bargaininig la Baron and Ferejohn 1989)

oTree App for Bargaining in Standing Committees with Endogenous Status Quo